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Abstract Human error can have potentially devastating
consequences in contexts such as healthcare, but there is a
rarely a simple dichotomy between errors and correct
behaviour. Furthermore, there has been little consideration
of how the activities of users (erroneous and otherwise)
relate to the conceptual fit between user and device, despite
the fact that healthcare technologies are becoming
increasingly prevalent and complex. In this article, we
present a study in which nurses’ conceptions of infusion
device practice were elicited to identify misfits. By
focusing on key concepts that users work with when setting
up infusions and the extent to which the system supports
them, our analysis highlights how actions are influenced by
the different resources available to users including: the
device itself; supporting artefacts; the conceptual under-
standing of the user; and the community of practice the
user is part of. The findings reveal the ways in which users
are resourceful in their day-to-day activities and also sug-
gest potential vulnerabilities within the wider system that
could threaten patient safety. Our approach is able to make
previously under-explored aspects of practice visible, thus
enabling insight into how users act and why.
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1 Introduction
Human error remains a significant concern across safety–
critical contexts, including healthcare. For instance, the
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency in
the UK attributed 21 % of incidents involving infusion
devices to user error (MHRA 2013). Given the potentially
severe consequences of errors, previous research has
focused on incident reports to examine the circumstances
surrounding errors that have occurred (e.g. Benner et al.
2002). However, adverse events are often under-reported
(Husch et al. 2005; Morag et al. 2012), while the reports
themselves often lack the necessary detail to establish why
the error occurred (Nemeth et al. 2009a, b). In addition,
Dekker (2007) argues that error counting systems ‘‘uphold
an illusion of rationality and control but may offer neither
real insight nor productive routes for improving safety’’. In
contrast, within this paper, we focus on investigating a
device’s ‘‘fitness for purpose’’ (Blandford et al. 2014b) and
on understanding how work is carried out in context in
order to highlight system vulnerabilities that can be
addressed to reduce the likelihood of error and improve
patient safety.
As Norman (2002) points out, there is not ‘‘a simple
dichotomy between errors and correct behavior’’ (p. 140)
and there is much that happens in healthcare practice that is
‘‘invisible’’ (e.g. Furniss et al. 2011a). For instance, Furniss
et al. (2011b) introduce the notion of ‘‘unremarkable
errors’’ in healthcare that are described as ‘‘low-level dis-
turbances’’ or ‘‘performance deviations’’ that occur during
day-to-day activities: e.g. entering the wrong number into a
device, then correcting it or forgetting to tell a patient how
long their treatment will last. These minor deviations often
remain invisible despite the fact that investigating why they
occur, and how users try to recover from them, could have
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significant design implications on a technological and
socio-technical level. Blandford et al. (2014a) argue that,
without an understanding of actual use feeding into design,
devices are often developed and implemented in ways that
are not fit for purpose.
Assessing fitness for purpose requires further attention
as technology is not only growing more prevalent in
healthcare contexts but also becoming more complicated.
For instance, Douglas and Leigh (2001) note that devices
that were once only used in critical care units are now
commonplace in general wards. Infusion devices are a
case in point; these are used to administer intravenous
(IV) drugs to patients after being programmed by clinical
staff who input data into the pumps regarding the volume
and rate (volume/time) of medication to be delivered.
However, there is evidence that users sometimes confuse
key concepts (such volume and rate; Garmer et al. 2002),
suggesting that devices do not always support appropriate
conceptual understandings. Meanwhile, technology con-
tinues to evolve with the introduction of ‘‘smart pumps’’
(which include software that requires further information
about the patient and medication to be entered so it can
perform additional checks to detect possible errors).
However, the uptake of smart pump technology has been
slow in the UK (Iacovides et al. 2014), and functions tend
to be underused due to a lack of user understanding
(Lamsdale et al. 2005; Rothschild et al. 2005; Nemeth
et al. 2009a, b). Furthermore, there is evidence that the
growing complexity of these devices is getting in the way
of users forming mental models that reliably support
device operation (Nunnally et al. 2004). In addition to
having to manage demanding workloads, nursing staff are
expected to be competent in using these increasingly
complex devices, regardless of their clinical and techno-
logical expertise (Iacovides et al. 2013). However, while
previous research has explored the use of technology
through evaluating the general usability of medical
devices such as infusion pumps (e.g. Graham et al. 2004),
and focusing on specific design issues such as number
entry input (e.g. Cauchi et al. 2014), very little attention
has been paid to the mismatches that occur between user
and device and how these may cause vulnerabilities
within the wider system.
1.1 Background
Existing usability methods such as heuristic evaluation,
task analysis and think aloud have previously been applied
to evaluate infusion devices (e.g. Zhang et al. 2003;
Ginsburg 2005; Lamsdale et al. 2005), but these tend to
focus on task structures rather than conceptual fit between
user and device. While one of the heuristics that experts
need to apply as part of a heuristic evaluation states that the
‘‘image of the system perceived by users should match the
model the users have about the system’’ (p. 25; Zhang et al.
2003), questions remain about what models users actually
have of infusion devices and how well a particular device is
able to match them.
A focus on mismatches can yield insight into the causes
of error within safety–critical domains. Baxter et al.
(2007) note that cognitive mismatches can take many
forms, including ‘‘mode confusion’’ where pilots believe
that the aircraft system is in one mode when in fact it is
operating in a different one. The authors suggest that
problems can arise due to a lack of transparency in the
automation’s interface, affecting a pilot’s ability to
accurately predict the aircraft’s behaviour. However,
within the context of healthcare, focus has been less on
mismatch between user and device and more on mis-
matches between different people’s mental models; e.g.
Morag et al. (2012) examined differences between the
mental models of physicians and nurses on a gynaecology
ward. While mismatches between people’s mental models
of work processes can lead to difficulties and failures,
there is a need to also consider how the technology used
within a ward environment may also contribute to error
when there is a mismatch between user and device. In
addition, given that cognition can be distributed across
people, technology, physical context and time (Hutchins
1995), there is need to understand the interaction not just
between user and device but between user, device and the
supporting artefacts e.g. prescription charts, personal
notes etc. that are used in actual practice (Back and Cox
2013; Back et al. 2013).
Our approach draws upon previous work by Blandford
and colleagues (e.g. Blandford et al. 2008; Blandford
2013), which considers the extent to which a system is able
to support users’ conceptual understanding. In order to
carry out an analysis of conceptual fit, the first step
involves eliciting key user conceptions before identifying
mismatches between user and device, i.e. misfits between
‘‘the way the user thinks and the representation imple-
mented within the system’’ (p. 394; Blandford et al. 2008).
For instance, after conducting a contextual inquiry within a
law firm, Attfield and Blandford (2011) identified several
issues within a current-awareness alert system that related
to a lack of representation of key user concepts at the
interface and system level e.g. each alert item contained
information from particular articles or documents, which
were often important for the user to access, but the system
did not always support a direct link to the source material.
This issue led users to stop interacting with the system and
having to carry out separate online searches. However,
there has been little work in the area of medical device
safety that has investigated the extent to which a particular
technology supports user understanding.
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Given that people’s conceptual models are informed by
the tools available to them and the context they work
within, we aimed to understand how both internal and
external resources influence user action (Hutchins 1995).
Therefore, we focus on conceptions of infusion device
practice, which relate to concepts pertaining to the device
and those relating to the domain of use, to explore the
interaction between user, device and supporting artefacts.
The aim of this study was to identify these mismatches as a
necessary step to informing future design.
2 Method
2.1 Overview
As Wolf et al. (2006; p. 5) ‘‘Understanding the complex
nature of nurses’ cognitive work offers a new perspective
for the analysis of the environmental conditions that create
risk for medical errors or omissions in care’’). While
observation can yield useful insights into practice, the
rationale behind particular actions can be unclear (Wolf
et al. 2006). In addition, the demanding nature of nurses’
work means it can be distracting to ask a member of staff to
explain aspects of practice while they are working in a busy
environment (Furniss et al. 2014; Blandford et al. 2015).
Due to similar reasons, methods such as contextual inquiry
(Beyer and Holtzblatt 1998), involving observation and
interviews that take place within a user’s normal work
environment, can be difficult to implement in healthcare
contexts. Thus, we looked to teach-back techniques that
aim to elicit user conceptions through asking participants to
carry out tasks on a device and explain what they are doing
as if they were teaching a novice. For instance, Clark and
Sasse (1997) compared groups of new and existing users of
an online tool, which facilitated setting up and participating
in online events, to teach a contrived co-learner about the
tool after they had spent some time using it. Transcripts of
the sessions were then analysed to elicit key user concepts
regarding infusion device practice and to consider any
mismatches that arose when the user was interacting with
the device and any supporting artefacts.
Our study included two semi-structured interviews,
where the first session was introductory, focusing on elicit-
ing background information, and the second revolved
around the teach-back tasks. A thematic analysis was then
carried out on the transcripts (Braun and Clarke 2006) to
identify particular mismatches relating to the interaction
between user, device and supporting artefacts. The Research
and Development team at the hospital reviewed the study
and concluded it did not require National Health Service
ethical approval. The study was granted ethical approval by
the University Research Ethics Committee, while
permission was sought from the Associate Dean of Nursing,
who also helped to facilitate access to nursing staff.
2.2 Participants
Seventeen nurses (16 female, 1 male; mean age:
39.6 years) took part in the study. This was a snowball
sample recruited from across a number of clinical areas
within a large, urban, acute UK hospital. Table 1 indicates
which areas each nurse worked within, how many years of
experience they had (mean = 11.71; standard devia-
tion = 7.81) and how long they had worked at the hospital
(mean = 4.94; standard deviation = 4.35). The majority
of nurses involved in the study worked in oncology, Pae-
diatrics and intensive treatment units (ITU) though one
nurse worked on a surgical ward and three others worked in
cancer research (e.g. delivering new drugs as part of clin-
ical trials). Efforts to standardise infusion devices have led
to many UK hospitals attempting to use a single brand of
infusion device across the whole organisation (Iacovides
et al. 2014), so all the nurses who participated in the study
regularly used the same model of large volume infusion
pump which had been used at the hospital for several years.
We recruited nurses from different clinical areas and who
had a range of experience in order to increase the gener-
alisability of our findings. Out of the 17 participants
recruited, 14 also completed the second interview, which
took place 1–2 weeks after the first.
2.3 Procedure
For the convenience of participants, interviews took place
at meeting rooms on the hospital site. Two interviews were
planned with each participant, and each interview was
conducted by two interviewers; one led the interview and
focused on device use, and the other asked questions about
supporting artefacts.
In the first interview, participants were asked to give an
overview of their main role and responsibilities, to explain
what infusion device training they had received and to
explain how they use infusion devices to treat patients.
Participants were also asked about common and uncom-
mon infusions and if they, or another staff member, had
ever had any difficulties with the pump. To further
understand the interaction between user, device and envi-
ronment, this included a discussion of the different arte-
facts they used to support the delivering of IV medications
e.g. prescription charts, handover sheets and any personal
notes or calculations. The interview was audio recorded
and lasted approximately 30 min.
For the second interview, participants were asked to
bring in recent prescription charts containing IV prescrip-
tions they had delivered through a pump and any additional
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supporting artefacts, such as personal notes, that they used
as part of the delivery process (after having redacted any
patient and clinician information with a black marker pen).
At the start of the interview, each participant was asked to
discuss the charts and any additional materials they brought
in and explain how they were used to deliver particular
infusions. The teach-back activity occurred in the second
part of the interview, where a training infusion pump was
available for participants to carry out two programming
tasks. These tasks were selected from the real-world
examples they had brought in e.g. a nurse from Paediatrics
was asked to demonstrate how she would set up the pump
to deliver IV fluids to a child suffering from dehydration.
While carrying out the tasks, the interviewers prompted the
participant to explain what they were doing and why, as if
they were nurses who had completed their IV therapy and
device training and has recently started on the ward. The
prompts included questions about how the medications
were prepared, the exact values that were entered into the
device, checks that occurred before and after the infusion
was running and what happened at the end of an infusion.
The second session was video recorded and lasted between
45 and 60 min. Participants were paid £35 at the comple-
tion of both interviews.
2.3.1 Setting up an infusion device
Before discussing the main analysis and findings, we first
provide a broad overview of how the infusion device is
normally set up to deliver medication to illustrate how
programming the pump is only part of the whole procedure.
The process usually begins with a particular infusion being
prescribed to a patient and via a prescription chart. The
nurse then has to collect the infusion, or sometimes they
have to make it up themselves by combining a particular
drug with intravenous (IV) fluid. Depending on the medi-
cation prescribed, the units can be given as a weight (e.g.
micrograms) or a volume (e.g. millilitres). Nurses often
have to carry out different calculations, such as establishing
what dose a patient requires (e.g. based on their weight) or
converting prescribed units into values they can enter into
the pump. The pump itself requires a volume, rate and/or
time to be entered. Before programming the pump, the
nurse is required to carry out a series of checks to make
sure the right drug and dose is being administered to the
right patient, through the right route, within the right time
frame. Also, a second nurse is often asked to provide a
second check of the treatment prepared or retrieved.
The nurse then sets up the infusion by inserting the
giving set (the line connecting the bag or bottle of medi-
cation to the patient) into the pump and ‘‘priming’’ the line.
Priming involves running the infusion through the giving
set and ensuring there are no air bubbles in the line, and can
be done manually or through the pump. The giving set also
has a ‘‘roller clamp’’ attached to it (this is usually a plastic
device equipped with a small roller that may be rolled to
close off or open IV tubing). When closed, the roller clamp
stops the liquid running out of the line, while it needs to be
opened to allow the infusion to run through. After priming,
the line is connected to the patient via a particular point of
access, e.g. a ‘‘cannula’’ (a thin tube inserted into a vein,
often in the back of the hand or the inside of the arm). The
Table 1 Participant details
Participant Clinical area Years of nursing experience Years at the hospital
A Oncology 5 5
B Oncology 19 1
C Research nurse 6 2.5
D Oncology 9 1
E Research nurse 5.5 0.5
F Oncology 8 8
G Paediatric 21 3
H Paediatric 1 1
K Research nurse 23 7
L Paediatric 11 9
M Paediatric 4 1
N Paediatric 5 0.5
O Surgery 4 2
P ITU 13.5 8.5
Q ITU 24 8
R ITU 20 14
S ITU 20 12
Italicised participants only took part in the first interview
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nurse then enters the required values into the device and
starts the infusion. The nurse administering the infusion
must then sign the patient’s medicine administration chart,
which must also be signed by the second nurse to confirm
the appropriate checks have occurred.
When the infusion is running, various alarms can go off
to indicate issues such as air in the line (small air bubbles
may build up over time), an occlusion (for instance, the
patient may be lying on the tubing), the battery is running
low, the infusion is about to finish or the infusion has
ended. Depending on the type of infusion, patients may
also need regular checks, e.g. to assess fluid intake and
output or to make sure they are not having an adverse
reaction. Particularly in an intensive care context, where
patients are often receiving multiple drugs via different
devices, vital signs such as blood pressure are monitored
closely for any changes.
2.3.2 Analysis
All interview sessions were transcribed, and a thematic
analysis was carried out using NVivo 10. The analysis
focused on eliciting key user conceptions related to infu-
sion device practice and mismatches between user and
device i.e. misfits between ‘‘the way the user thinks and the
representation implemented within the system’’ (p. 394;
Blandford et al. 2008).
Early analysis focused on transcripts from both inter-
views, where key user concepts were elicited e.g. ‘‘infu-
sion’’, ‘‘giving set’’, ‘‘priming’’ in order to facilitate
consideration of how well the system was able to support
them. Later stages then focused on the transcripts from the
second interview, where themes that related to identifying
different mismatches and how they could lead to error were
identified and refined. The process involved investigating
particular instances of confusion within the transcripts (e.g.
around what an interface symbol represented or what
details were checked once an infusion was set up and
running) before examining the associated video footage to
clarify the details referred to during teach-back. The
themes were identified by iterating between the phases
outlined by Braun and Clark (2006) before writing up the
findings: familiarisation with the data; generating initial
codes; searching for themes; reviewing themes; defining
and naming themes. Blandford (2013) argues that inter-
rater reliability is not an appropriate way to validate a rich
interpretative data analysis; instead, the focus was on dis-
cussions between the authors regarding emerging themes
and basing interpretations on triangulating interview tran-
scripts with video recordings and relevant supporting
documents (such as prescription charts and the device
manual). For instance, one of the emerging themes related
to the fact that nurses have to work with a range of units
when delivering infusions—in addition to mentioning dif-
ferent units within the interviews, the documents supplied
by nurses illustrated how medications differed in terms of
the units they were prescribed in.
3 Findings
The final set of themes are: the range of measurement units;
interface symbols and options; configuration of the device;
checking; and volume to be infused (VTBI) values.
3.1 Range of measurement units
The infusion device works with three sets of values: vol-
ume to be infused (VTBI), represented in mls (millilitres);
time represented in hours and minutes; and rate, repre-
sented in mls per hour. However, nurses have to work with
a whole range of different units depending on the type of
infusion to be delivered.
For instance, some therapies are not premixed by the
hospital pharmacy and therefore require preparation prior
to administration. This involves ensuring that the correct
dose is added to the bag of fluid. Figure 1 illustrates a
supporting artefact, that contains a calculation so that
AMIKACIN can be infused at a rate of 100 ml/hr. The
nurse had to use a formula to calculate how much AMI-
KACIN should be added to the bag of fluid. The manu-
facturer provides AMIKACIN in 500 mg doses in 2 ml of
fluid. A calculation was used to determine that 1.68 ml of
the 2 ml AMIKACIN fluid needed to be added to the bag
since the prescription was for 420 mg.
Another example of when calculations occur is in
therapies where patient weight needs to be factored into
establishing the correct dose. Figure 2 illustrates an
Fig. 1 Prescription chart example
Cogn Tech Work (2016) 18:793–805 797
123
additional supporting artefact, where the infusion rate for
DOBUTAMINE was calculated, through the use of a for-
mula. Firstly, the dose of the medication per ml has to be
determined. In this case there is 5 mg per ml. The next
stage involves multiplying the derived dose per ml by the
patient’s weight and the number of minutes in 1 h. This is
then divided by the drug concentration. Sometimes this
drug concentration is in micrograms rather than milligrams
which requires units to be converted. The infusion rate per
hour can then be calculated; in this case it is 4.8 ml/hr.
Thus, the units on the prescription chart do not always
correspond directly to what values need to be entered into
the pump, creating potential for error. While recent
developments in smart pump technology can allow users to
work with dose measurements through using ‘‘drug
libraries’’ (pre-loaded lists of medications and fluids), some
participants expressed concerns about these developments:
‘‘I think we all do mls per hour, and it’s probably safer to
do that, really, because if you’ve got them programming it
for milligrams, it would probably cause confusion, I think,
to be honest. I think you can do that with them, but I’ve
never… I don’t want to learn that way’’ (Participant Q,
ITU). Though smart pumps seem like a way to reduce
error, the concerns expressed suggest that they could create
a mismatch between the functionality provided by the
pump and current nursing practice.
3.2 Interface symbols and options
The device interface consists of a small display screen that
includes: four arrow keys (up, down, left, right to navigate
menus and input values); seven other buttons, including a
yellow one labelled ‘‘BOL’’ (short for ‘‘bolus’’—explained
below) and a blue one with three white arrow-like symbols
on it (to connect the pump to an additional programming
station known as ‘‘Space Control’’); and three LED lights:
yellow, green/red and blue (to signify different alarms and
statuses). Participants used all of the buttons, apart from
‘‘BOL’’ (as its function differed according to context—
explained below) and the ‘‘Space Control’’ function (which
was not required within the hospital). With respect to the
latter, they were also unaware of what the function was for,
e.g. ‘‘That’s a good question. I’ve never used it’’ (Partici-
pant P, ITU).
With respect to the display screen there was also some
confusion over an option that appears after inserting the
giving set into the pump and closing the door where the
display prompts the user to select ‘‘SpaceLine’’. This refers
to the type of giving set being used where ‘‘SpaceLine’’ is
the standard line (in oncology for instance they use a non-
PVC set that does not react with chemotherapy drugs).
While several participants were aware of what the term
referred to e.g. ‘‘So then it says, SpaceLine. That’s just the
type of line it is’’. (Participant H, Paediatrics), others were
not so sure e.g. when asked what the option was: ‘‘It’s so
that it starts, like, going into the line, I think’’ (Participant
N, Paediatrics).
In addition, there was some confusion over the various
symbols displayed on the screen. Most participants were
aware of the symbol that indicated the infusion had started
running (moving arrows) and those that represented the
battery supply and whether the device was plugged in, but
there were additional symbols e.g. Therapy Profile (repre-
sented by an abstract symbol), which no one could explain,
and presumably were not set up for use. The symbols
relating to pressure were more commonly referred to, with
some participants indicating a good understanding about
what they represented e.g. ‘‘Sometimes the line’s kinked,
you can just straighten and that will do it. Shall I show you
an occlusion? This is it. This is your pumping pres-
sure\kinks line and show us how the symbol changes[’’
(Participant Q, ITU). Depending on the clinical area,
pressure options may or may not be configurable by the
user. Pressure seemed a particular concern within Paedi-
atrics due to the fact children tend to have smaller veins
e.g. ‘‘Our paediatric pumps are set to different pressures.
So, like, the dotted line means the maximum pressure… So
it’s not going to alarm here, but if it goes over that line…’’
(Participant N, Paediatrics).
In general however, there was an assumption that the
device itself would let them know whether there was a
problem so they often did not pay attention to the majority
of symbols. For instance, Participant K (Research) thought
one of the pressure symbols related to the rate but went on
to suggest ‘‘we don’t usually pay attention to all that, we
just deliver what needs to be delivered, not the technical-
ities of the machine’’. Similarly, Participant O (Surgery)
suggested that the device would let them know whether
something was wrong: ‘‘You look at the pump to make sure
Fig. 2 Calculation example
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that the pump is running …. But if the pump is, if there is
any issue going on, like I said, the pump will be alarming
anyway’’. The mismatches regarding the interface symbols
and options are relatively minor given that the information
ignored was not considered necessary for day-to-day
activities. However, the issues do suggest a particular
reliance on the pump to signify a problem, rather than
ensuring a comprehensive examination of the patient and
access points occurs. For instance, extravasation can occur
when IV medications accidentally leak into the tissue
around the infusion site but this is not something a pump is
able to sense (Quinn 2008). Thus, there could be mismatch
between what the user understands the pump is capable of
and what it is actually able to do.
3.3 Configuration of the device
While the same large volume pump was used across the
hospital, there were differences between how devices in
particular areas were configured in terms of the functions
made available, even though the interface was the same.
For instance, in Paediatrics, nurses were able to change
pressure settings (but this feature was not available in other
areas), while in the majority of clinical areas the pump was
set up to be primed by pressing the ‘‘BOL’’ button (apart
from in ITU). ‘‘BOL’’ is short for bolus: a single large dose
of a medication that is given to a patient over a relatively
short period of time. However, ‘‘priming’’ refers to the
process of running the fluids from an intravenous bag
through the giving set to make sure there is no air in the
tubing before it is connected to the patient. While the
mechanism the device uses to perform either task may the
same (i.e. a programme that runs a certain volume of fluid
through the pump relatively quickly), there was some
confusion around these important clinical terms. For
instance, Participant E (Research) stated: ‘‘that’s what they
were taught, the different way of bolusing it through the
line, yes. I was talking to one of the senior chemo nurses,
about priming the line and she says normally what she does
is puts ten mls into the machine and does it manually… So,
even she doesn’t know that the bolus line works’’ while
Participant M (Paediatrics) suggested ‘‘This is the priming.
It’s primed for the bolus’’. Thus, there is a mismatch
between how nurses understand the concept of priming and
how the pump represents this concept to users. However, as
Participant P (ITU) explains ‘‘…priming is different from
bolus. Totally different. And in ITU we don’t… we stick to
our priming and bolusing as separate, we don’t want to
bring these things together and cause confusion’’.
In ITU the pump prompts the user to prime when at the
start, and the ‘‘BOL’’ function is only used to programme a
bolus dose. Presumably the decision was made to use the
‘‘BOL’’ button for priming in other areas of the hospital as
the pump was not meant to be used for delivering a bolus
outside intensive care. While participants were generally
very aware of the importance of making sure that air
bubbles did not reach a patient, these examples suggest
how a mismatch can occur due to the way in which tech-
nology is set up (in this case, by the Medical Engineering
Department), leading to a potentially confusing use of
terms that are widely used within clinical practice.
3.4 Checking
The Nursing and Midwifery Council’s Code of Profes-
sional Conduct states that nurses ‘‘are personally respon-
sible for their practice’’ (NMC, 2004) where they are
subject to professional and legal accountability if an error
occurs (Hyde 2008). Thus, nurses are keen to minimise
potential risks through ensuring appropriate checks have
occurred prior to starting an infusion. As Participant L
(Paediatrics) describes: ‘‘You check that it was prescribed
properly, you’ve got the right patient, that the right amount
is going into the bag that you’re using, the right medicine,
it’s in date …You’re checking all of those things, and then
you’re checking the rate and the volume that is being
entered’’. The process often involved checking the details
of supporting artefacts as well as consulting a second
person before administration occurs. However, while the
majority of participants referred to the second checking of
calculations and details such as the medication and dose to
be delivered, it was not always clear exactly when these
checks occurred and what was checked. For instance, some
noted that second checking did not always extend to the
values that had been entered into the pump before the
infusion was started. For instance, Participant A (Oncol-
ogy) notes: ‘‘Ideally, we’re supposed to set the machine
together. We’re supposed to confirm the rate. We don’t
always do that, you’re so busy’’. In addition, Participant S
(ITU) explains ‘‘What doesn’t happen though, is, as that’s
then administered to the patient, the same person isn’t
called back to say, this is what I’m giving, this is the rate
I’m giving it at … I’m not sure how it would work from a
practical point of view, because that person that’s checked
that drug with you could well be in a side room’’. So while
second checking was seen as important, practical factors,
such as demands on time and layout of the ward, can get in
the way of getting another nurse to come back and check
the device. Second checking by another person is not
something the device explicitly supports, so there is a
potential mismatch between the functionality of device and
nursing practice.
There were instances however where participants would
describe using the pump itself as a kind of second check for
the values they entered into it. The device requires that the
user put in two out of three values (VTBI, time or rate) and
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will calculate the third automatically. As Participant F
(Oncology) explains: ‘‘it’s very simple and straightforward,
you put your volume, you put your hours and they calculate
it for you. Compared to the previous pump that we used
where we had to calculate the infusion rate and then put it
manually into the system, this one can just put, either you
just put your time that you want it to run over and it just
calculates a certain rate or you put it at a certain rate and it
gives you a certain time’’. In some cases nurses would rely
on this to make sure they had put in the correct values e.g.
‘‘I’m satisfied because I know it’s a half an hour infusion.
So, if it said an hour I’d know I’ve got one of these two
incorrect and I go back’’ (Participant E, Research). How-
ever, using this pump in this way relied on an accurate
understanding of the relationship between VTBI, time and
rate, which not everyone exhibited (see below).
3.5 Relationship between VTBI, time and rate
In the programming demonstrations (second interview),
two participants showed confusion concerning the rela-
tionship between the three values that could be entered into
the pump. In the first example, Participant O (Surgery) is
demonstrating a particular infusion that requires an initial
volume to be delivered over 15 min, where, if the patient
does not exhibit an adverse reaction, the infusion will be
continued over a longer period of time. However, during
the process, the nurse mixes up two of the values and is
surprised by what results. First, she enters the rate (which is
supposed to be 20 ml per hour) as the VTBI: ‘‘So 20 ml.
Hold on. Volume to be infused. Okay. So 20 ml in an hour.
And you want it for 15 min’’. However, once the user
entered VTBI as 20 ml and time as 15 min, the pump
automatically calculated a rate of 80 ml per hour. The
nurse did not realise that the pump was set up with the
incorrect rate until one of the interviewers pointed it out:
Participant
O
[referring to the rate] No, it’s 80 per hour.
We’re just using 15 min.
Interviewer
I
Yes, but no, [Interviewer J] is right. So it’s
20 ml per hour.
Participant
O
Oh right. Oh goodness me, no.
After some discussion and starting the process over, the
nurse works out what the correct values should be: ‘‘So the
rate would be 20 ml in an hour, that’s right. And then
15 min will be just 5 ml to be infused’’. In this case the rate
should have been 20 ml per hour, delivered in a time span
of 15 min, leading to just 5 ml being delivered. If the pump
had been connected to the patient and the correction had
not been made, then the patient would have received 20
mils in 15 min, which is four times what this particular step
in the drug protocol required.
In another example, Participant M (Paediatrics) has
already entered a VTBI of 100 mls into the machine and a
time of 30 min but is surprised by how high the rate is:
‘‘but basically the rates keep coming up as high rates,
which is 200…’’. After spending a few minutes going
through the interface menu to check the values on the
pump, the nurse reduces the rate to 50 mls and the duration
automatically changed to 2 h: ‘‘Let me just put 50 ….
Okay, so it’s running now for two hours, which we’re
supposed to run for half an hour’’. However, the nurse does
not seem to realise that a much lower volume will be
delivered to the patient within half an hour as a result (25
mls instead of the intended 100 mls).
While in both cases there may be additional factors to
take into account (for Participant O the infusion demon-
strated was not a routine one, while Participant M had just
finished a night shift), it was clear from these examples that
there is a mismatch between user conceptions and the
machine interface, as the pump does little to support an
understanding of how the concepts of VTBI, time and rate
relate to each other.
3.6 VTBI values
VTBI refers to the amount of fluid that the device is pro-
grammed to deliver to the patient, and is not necessarily the
same as the total volume of the bag or bottle attached to the
pump or the total volume of fluid a patient will receive as
part of their treatment. Participants used the term fre-
quently, though sometimes shortened it to volume, e.g.
‘‘the same volume over 30 min’’ (Participant C, Oncology).
In addition, it can be important to track a patient’s fluid
balance (their intake and output) e.g. for patients who are
dehydrated. In order to track this, nurses have to navigate
through the pump menu options and note down how much
volume has been delivered to the patient at particular
intervals e.g. ‘‘So every hour you would see how much had
gone through’’ (Participant K, Paediatrics).
However, while the VTBI value that was entered into the
pump could be the same as the amount specified on the
administration chart or the amount listed on the infusion bag
or bottle, this was not always the case (note that VTBI is not
always specified, as in the case of continuous infusions that
are delivered over several hours until a clinician decides to
stop or change the prescription). The actual value entered
depends on how a nurse conceptualises the infusion process
and what type of infusion is being delivered. For instance,
Participant B (Oncology) notes that, when administering
chemotherapy, which involved additional medication being
added to the bag: ‘‘there’s always extra in the bag … so I
100 % know that there is at least 500, and there is 30 mls of
drug. I put 530, that’s my volume. And then I, myself, would
do it over an hour and 25 min, because that gives you five
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minutes for your flush. So you’re actually doing it in an hour
and a half’’. A flush is an amount of solution delivered to
make sure all the medication has been delivered to a patient.
In the case of chemotherapy, Participant B explains: ‘‘We
have to finish the bag. Every drop of it. But then we have to
flush it. So if you now have a nurse that puts it 500 mls, and
there is 580, they actually don’t know how much is in the
bag most of the time. It’s a guesstimate. So then the pump
beeps, 5000s over. The patient says my drug’s done. You
look in the bag, and it’s not done, so then first of all, now
you have to tell the patient it’s not finished, so they get
annoyed … and it’s a waste of time’’.
In contrast, some participants who made up an infusion
themselves explained how they took out a particular amount
of fluid and replaced it with the additional medication in
order to keep the VTBI the same e.g. ‘‘You would take out
the 31.4 ml and put back in the 31.4 ml of the drug’’ (Par-
ticipant L, Paediatrics). In addition, others explained they
would enter a lower amount for VTBI, particularly in
relation to continuous infusions where they want to make
sure that air does not enter the giving set. The concern was
less about air reaching the patient (which the pump was
supposed to detect and stop) and more about managing
workloads with respect to trying to avoid spending more
time setting up a new infusion rather than just spiking a new
bag. As Participant A (Oncology) explains when carrying
out a blood transfusion: ‘‘So I would… for the first unit, I
would deduct about 30 ml, because I’ve used 20 to prime
the line and I need a bit left if I want it all to go through. I
would do the same if… if it’s just the one unit, I would just
put exactly the amount of volume’’. Similarly, Participant H
(Paediatrics) notes: ‘‘So they’ll write the fluid and they’ll put
500 ml, so that’s a 500 ml bag and they want that given at,
like the one I just did, at 63 ml an hour … so we set it at,
say, 480 or 470 because then what will happen is then the
machine will alarm while there’s still a bit of fluid, so it’s
not running through the pump dry … I think they auto-
matically cut out before they give [air] to the patient, but it
just stops it emptying and it stops the line emptying, because
then if they’re continuing on fluids and they’re the same
fluids, you can just then, if they’re prescribed, get another
bag and connect them back up’’.
There are particular safety issues that nurses appear to
be trying to avoid through giving themselves more time to
set up the next infusion. For instance, Participant S (ITU)
describes an incident where the VTBI entered meant that a
bag of medication ran out before the nurse was able to set
up a new one:
Participant
S
There has been an incident where there was
inotropes in a bag and the volume to be
infused was incorrect; the bag ran out, and






Yes. The bag ran out, and by the time… and
obviously the patient was receiving quite a
considerable amount of the drug, so blood
pressure walloped, and, yes.
Interviewer
J
But was the alarm not noticed, or…?




Yes…., no, it was…. but the time that it
was…that it then took to reconstitute
another bag, and I think….
Interviewer
I
Ah, ok, so the issue wasn’t, let’s say, air got
to the patient, it was that they weren’t





Part of the issue concerning the VTBI value appears to
stem from an uncertainty about when exactly the device
issues a ‘‘pre-alarm’’ to signal when the infusion is nearing
completion. For example, when asked when the pre-alarm
sounds, Participant S (ITU) answered: ‘‘I don’t know,
actually, when that alarm kicks in …. I don’t know how
they’re programmed to alarm—the only thing, again, from
experience, if I’m setting a pump up, I’ll always put the
volume to be infused less than I know the volume is … I
then basically obviously pick when the alarm alarms’’.
Similarly, Participant R (ITU) suggested that ‘‘I don’t
actually know if they’re set specifically … it really is
determined on how quickly the infusion is running at’’
while Participant B (Oncology) explained: ‘‘I don’t know
what the time was, they had a pre-alarm, and I had them
shortened. Because what happened was, is that they would
sit there and beep for 10 min. And it was driving everybody
crazy’’. Again, there seems to be a mismatch here in
relation to the time nurses require to set up an infusion and
when the pump is set to alarm to notify users an infusion is
almost finished. This mismatch adds to the issues described
above regarding the effect alarms have on people within
the environment and the different ways nurses conceptu-
alise the volume of fluid within a bag and giving set.
4 Discussion
In this article we focus on exploring conceptions of infu-
sion device practice and potential mismatches between user
and device. Through understanding the interaction between
external resources (the device interface and supporting
artefacts) and internal resources (user conceptions) the
findings revealed the ways in which user actions depend on
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the resources that are available to them. As Klein (1998)
argues, much of behaviour is skilled, unproblematic and
successful, particularly for experts, as in the examples of
nurses using the pump to check certain calculations or
entering a slightly different VTBI value than what was
prescribed. In these cases, nurses are able to draw upon
resources in a way that supports their day-to-day practice.
However, potential issues occur when nurses are unable to
do so, whether this is due to the way the device has been
designed (e.g. different interface symbols) or configured
(e.g. in the case of the ‘‘BOL’’ function), their own
understanding based on how they have been trained and
their own experience (e.g. of the relationship between
VTBI, time and rate) and nursing practice (e.g. the use of
different measurement units or whether second checking
by another user is expected to occur or not).
Previous work has investigated mismatches in relation
to a range of technologies including aviation (Baxter et al.
2007) and work systems (Attfield and Blandford 2011); our
work illustrates how medical technologies can also be
examined in terms of conceptual fit. Our approach involved
adopting a combination of interview and teach-back, where
we were able to elicit key user conceptions and gain insight
into mismatches between user and device without inter-
rupting user activities. By focusing on the key concepts
users work with, our findings indicate how practices can
vary, even within a single institution, and reveal potential
mismatches that could lead to error and affect patient
safety. We discuss the implications of our findings in
relation to infusion device design and training below.
4.1 Implications for design and training
With respect to the design of infusion device interfaces,
previous research has focused on issues such as complex
menu structures (Nunnally et al. 2004) or comparing a
modified version of an interface with an existing one
(Garmer et al. 2002). Instead, we focused on how well
users understand different aspects of the interface. The
findings highlight which functions and symbols were
redundant (due to features not used within the institution)
and which were problematic e.g. the fact that some users
were unaware that ‘‘SpaceLine’’ referred to a type of giving
set. In some areas more than one giving set could be used
e.g. for blood or chemotherapy treatments, requiring a
different option on the pump to be selected to ensure the
correct settings were in place (such as particular pressure
sensitivities required for different types of fluid). While
SpaceLine was the only option in many cases and could
generally be ignored, the fact that some nurses were
selecting options they did not understand is problematic.
Thus, there is potential to clarify the text options on the
pump to make clear that the selections offered relate to
different types of giving set, or even removing this step for
pumps used in environments when only one option is
available. In addition, an explanation of what the different
symbols mean and which are most relevant to practice
could be incorporated into device training sessions.
The findings of our study also illustrate how mismatches
between user and device can result from decisions made by
clinical engineering departments about how to config-
ure the device in the first place. While a policy decision
may have been made to disable the bolus function in areas
outside ITU, it is not clear why it was also decided that the
‘‘BOL’’ button be used to prime instead; especially since
given that the device can automatically prompt the user to
‘‘Prime the line’’ when starting a new infusion. Through
adopting a human factors approach to understanding
technology use within a wider system (Holden 2011), our
findings not only reveal variations in practice regarding
whether nurses prefer to prime the line manually or through
the pump, but also indicate policy variations between
clinical areas. Furthermore, this decision seems to have
influenced how nurses refer to these terms, indicating that
some have confused these important clinical concepts. To
reduce this potential confusion, the device could be set up
in all areas to prompt the user to ‘‘Prime the line’’ at the
start of a new infusion, where the ‘‘BOL’’ button is either
disabled completely or reserved only for carrying out a
bolus infusion.
Checking is another issue where there is potential for
error, particularly since it is not clear whether the values
entered into the pump are always checked by a second
person. Unfortunately, as previous research indicates (Ar-
mitage 2008), due to issues such as deference to authority,
reduction of individual responsibility, shallow checks and
lack of time, double-checking is not an assured way to
reduce error. Furthermore, infusion devices do not explic-
itly support this aspect of practice, leading to attempted
solutions such as using clocks on drip stands to display
when checks need to occur (Iacovides, Cox and Blandford
2013). While independent (rather than side-by-side) checks
(Armitage 2008) and advances in technology (such as in-
built dose calculators) may help, there is further scope here
to explore how infusion devices could support users in
carrying out additional checks. However, while some par-
ticipants showed their expertise by taking advantage of the
fact that the device performs automatic calculations of a
third variable after the first two are entered, this was not a
widespread strategy. Using the device in this way would be
a quick and easy way for individuals to check their own
calculations, and is something that should be referred to
explicitly within training to reinforce user understanding of
the relationship between the three variables.
In addition, part of the reason why only some staff
adopted this strategy may be that the device itself does not
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seem to support an understanding of the relationship
between VTBI, time and rate. The display screen on the
pump is relatively small, and when entering a particular
value, only that value can be viewed on the screen so there
is little indication that one of the others may change. A
failure to appreciate the relationship between these values
could lead to situations where a patient does not receive an
infusion at the correct rate or within the appropriate time
frame, potentially jeopardising their safety. In terms of
design implications, this suggests that infusion devices
would benefit from incorporating larger screens that are
able to display a graphical representation of these concepts,
making clear how they influence each other (a similar
suggestion has previously been made by Nemeth 2009a, b)
and thus reducing potential for confusion.
Another one of our findings illustrates that the VTBI
value entered into the pump differed from what was pre-
scribed due to factors such as how nurses conceptualised
the amount of fluid in the bag or bottle and what type of
infusion is being delivered. Previous work which examined
the numbers used in a hospital via infusion pump logs has
suggested that numbers such as 100, 500 and 1000 should
have dedicated buttons in order to speed up the program-
ming process (Wiseman et al. 2013). In contrast, our
findings are that practice around what values are entered
into the pump varies and that such dedicated buttons may
be less useful. Thus, we would argue that, for this particular
context at least, an infusion device with dedicated value
buttons would be inappropriate and should be avoided.
4.2 Further work
One of the limitations of our work is that we focused on a
single institution and infusion device. While we attempted
to improve the generalisability of our findings by including
participants from across clinical areas, further work is
required to examine how infusion device practice and
associated conceptions vary within and across institutions.
Though our findings would be useful to inform this par-
ticular institution’s training programme and how the device
is set up across clinical areas, suggestions regarding design
implications for infusion pumps in general would benefit
from further work that considers the match between user
and device in other hospital contexts.
In addition, while our analysis indicates that the range of
medication units involved in preparing and administering
infusions creates potential for error, the solution is not as
simple as redesigning pumps to ensure that the units pre-
scribed can be entered straight into the pump. Not only do
prescribing practices vary between clinical areas, but the
units depend on what type of infusion is being prescribed.
In addition, nursing practice stems from how nurses are
trained to deliver infusions and what they observe in the
ward, which would also be hard to change. While recent
developments in smart pump technology are attempting to
address some of these issues, e.g. by providing dose cal-
culators as part of the device software, this technology has
yet to become widespread in the UK and its impact on
safety is unclear (Iacovides et al. 2014). Further work
needs to be carried out to examine smart pumps to assess
whether the additional functions they provide, and how
they are implemented, are effective in ensuring a ‘‘tighter’’
conceptual fit and reducing the chances of error occurring.
An ongoing project (Blandford et al. 2016) is investigating
this further.
This study has, on a small scale, highlighted the vari-
ability in practices in the ways that IV medications are
prescribed and administered, pumps are configured, and
staff are trained. While some of this variability is
unavoidable, much of it is a consequence of evolving local
practices over time (Wenger 1998). The findings highlight
the need for a much larger programme of research into the
systems and practices of IV medication management, with
a view to standardising and optimising procedures and
practices so as to better align the design and configuration
of technology and the training of staff with the broader
systems of practice they support.
4.3 Conclusion
Within the context of medical device safety, Blandford,
Vincent and Furniss (Blandford et al. 2014b) argue that
‘‘greater attention needs to be paid to learning points in
actual use and user experience (i.e. work as done)’’ (p.
107) emphasising the need to ‘‘raise questions about the
suitability of the design itself, and whether design and
use are misaligned’’ to establish a device’s ‘‘fitness for
purpose’’ (p. 108). Due to practical limitations, we were
unable to carry out the interviews within the work
environment of participants. However, by using real-
world examples of prescribed IV infusions as part of the
teach-back activity we were able to gain insights into
work as done by tapping into how users conceptualised
different aspects of practice around device use. In addi-
tion, by focusing on mismatches, we were able to con-
sider aspects of device design and how the device has
been implemented within different contexts, thus raising
questions about its fitness for purpose. By making visible
under-explored aspects of practice, our findings highlight
ways in which users draw upon a range of resources in
their day-to-day activities and indicate how vulnerabili-
ties in the wider system can be created when users are
unable to draw upon these resources successfully. In
addition, such an approach can also be used to develop
recommendations for design and training, for improving
patient safety.
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